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INVIGORATING ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION IN PURSUIT OF
U.S. LABOR OBJECTIVES
PhillipR Seckman
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of international labor law at the beginning of the twentieth
century and a motivating influence behind the formation of the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") was the prevention of international competition that
exploited the vacuum of labor regulation at the expense of workers.' World
governments were hesitant to institute greater protections for workers due to a
concern that doing so would make their domestic labor more expensive and
therefore less competitive with other markets where cheaper labor could be found.2
Thus, the ILO was created in part to protect national economies by promoting
enhanced protections in all member states, thereby ensuring labor protections
would be to some extent equivalent between the member states.
In 1944, the Declaration of Philadelphia reaffirmed the purpose of the ILO
following the Second World War by primarily focusing on economic and social
progress for all workers. 4 In the 1970s, the notion that increasing the protections
of workers m developing nations would materially impact the competitive edge of
developed labor markets was no longer seen as a primary justification for
international labor standards. 5 By the beginning of the 1990s, however, with a new

J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Denver, College of Law.
1.Nicolas Valticos & K. Samson, InternationalLabour Law, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ININDUSTRIALiZED MARKEr ECONOMICs, 110 (Roger Blanpam & Chris
Engles eds., 1998) [hereinafter Labour Law]. The Treaty of Versailles created the ILO in 1919. See
Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, pt. XIII, June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43, 225 Consol. T.S. 188. The Treaty of Versailles was not the first international agreement
concerning labor. The first agreement was the 1890 Conference of Berlin, and later, non-governmental
institutions created private organization called the International Association of Labor Legislation. See
Jennifer L. Johnson, Public-Private-PublicConvergence: How the Private Actor Can Shape Public
InternationalLaborStandards,24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 291, 305 (1998).
2. ILO, ILO History, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm (last visited, Mar.
13, 2004) [hereinafter ILO History]; ILO CONST. pmbl.
3. See ILO History, supranote 2.
4. ILO CONST. Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor
Organization, art. I [hereinafter Declaration of Philadelphia]; see also Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110.
5. See Nicolas Valticos, InternationalSources and InternationalAspects, in 15 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1,4-5 (1978).
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wave of globalization,6 the proposition that a labor market with significantly
greater labor protections is less competitive than labor markets having fewer
protections once again became a primary concern of ILO member states.7
The first part of this paper will argue that U.S. employers are moving "whitecollar" positions 8 overseas partially because of stronger worker protection
enforcement in the U.S. relative to developing countries and partially because the
effects of globalization have vastly enhanced the viability of exporting labor. The
second part of the paper will explore two possible avenues for enforcing higher
labor standards globally. 9 Thus, the discussion in the second part will be broken
up into two sub-parts. In the first sub-part, the presumption against extraterritorial
application of U.S. labor laws will be explored. The second sub-part will assess
whether the ILO can serve as an engine to further U.S. labor objectives. The
discussion will survey a number of ILO conventions, argue there is presently a lack
of effective enforcement of those conventions, and assess the viability of using the
World Trade Organization's (WTO's) dispute resolution process as template for
change. Finally, the third part of the paper will argue that U.S. lawmakers should
take a leadership role in the ILO, first by ratifying more ILO conventions, and
second by working to invigorate ILO enforcement mechanisms in an effort to
ensure the U.S. labor market remains competitive with developing markets.
I.

A.

WHY U.S. EMPLOYERS ARE EXPORTING LABOR ABROAD

A BriefHistory

At the turn of the century, U.S. workers and the labor they provided were seen
as mere commodities by businesses.' 0 Employers acted swiftly to prevent their

6. Globalization has been described, and will be used in this paper to refer to, the "integration of
driven by new technologies, new economic relationships, and the national
economies and societies
governments, international organizations, business, labour and civil
and international policies of
society. See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, The Social Dimension of
Globalization,at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/globali/index.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
7. See LabourLaw, supranote 1,at 110.
8. The problem facing U.S. white collar workers is that countries like India and Russia have
sunilarly educated workers whose wages are substantially lower than those in the U.S. ASHOK DEO
BARDHAN & CYNTHIA A. KROLL, THE NEW WAVE OF OUTSOURCING 4 (Fall 2003), available at
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/news/ResearchReport Fall 2003.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter New Wave]. Thus, Multinational companies can hire those workers and use new
technologies like the Internet to further decrease operating and management costs. Id.
9. This paper will focus on the options of applying U.S. domestic labor laws to conduct abroad

and invigorating the ILO enforcement mechanisms by vesting the ILO with powers akin to the WTO
Dispute Resolution Procedures. This paper will not discuss other potential options for enhancing
enforcement of international labor standards. Among the options not addressed in this paper are
increased U.S. involvement in the ILO technical assistance program and the initiation of unilateral trade
sanctions by the U.S. For a detailed discussion of U.S. unilateral action, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm
Internationalizationand U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
10. Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clarifying
Policiesand Interests, 31. B.C. L. REV. 31, 37 (1989).
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workers from forming into unions and the government was complicit in this
endeavor." Additionally, the courts at this time were wedded to the freedom of
contract theory, which held that when a worker and employer were dickering the2
terms of the employment contract, the two parties had equal bargaining power.'
This period is now pejoratively referred to as the Lochner era and pointed to as an
example of empty formalism.' 3 In truth, the Lochner era worker did not have
anything close to equal bargaining power and both the courts and Congress came
to recognize that workers needed the assistance of the government to level the
playing field.14
Following the U.S. Great Depression, the government adopted a new
approach when it came to the everyday worker. 15 Congress passed laws making
substantial gains m protecting the ability of working men and women to organize
and bargain collectively 16 Such laws also ensured that workers received a fair7
week.'
wage for their labor and created maximum limits on working hours per
The substance of these laws represented valuable gains for workers. During the
past decade, the protections of equal opportunity the right to a fair wage, and the
freedom to organize gamed by U.S. workers generally, have been threatened by the
competition of cheap labor abroad.' 8 The danger is that the struggle endured to
win these rights will amount to a "Pyrrhic victory" because employment
protections are worthless if the worker is unemployed.' 9
While U.S. workers made great strides in terms of acquiring enhanced labor
protections over the last century, there is concern that these protections will be lost,
20
in part, due to the current lack of enforceable international labor standards. The
U.S. worker is left unemployed, and history suggests that if they are lucky to find
21
new work, it is often for less compensation than the previous position.
Moreover, the foreign worker captures a small fraction of the value their work
creates for the multi-national corporation (MNC).2 2 Additionally, a U.S. worker
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (holding a law regulating the hours a
baker could work in given day to ten hours day unconstitutional because it interfered with the
freedom to contract between the worker and the employer).
13. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional
Truths, 82 N.C.L.REv. 115, 127 (2003).
14. See Collingsworth, supra note 10, at 37-38.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id.at41.
18. Karen Vossler Champion, Comment, Who Paysfor Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade
and InternationalLabor Standards,22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 181, 192 (1996); see also New
Wave, supra note 8, at 1.
19. Collingsworth, supra note 10, at 32.
20. See Champion, supranote 18, at 192

21. Loai G. KLETZER, JOB Loss FROM IMPORTS: MEASURING THE COSTS 33 (2001) (examining
job losses in manufacturing from 1979 to 1999 and finding that a quarter of factory workers who found
work took a cut of twenty five percent or more in compensation).
22. Christopher Farrell, Protectionism Won't End Workers' Pain, BuS.WK.ONLINE, Oct. 20,
2003, available at http://weblO.epnet.com/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2004) (noting that "for every $1.45 to
$1.47 of value created globally by offshore outsourcing, the U.S. captures $1.12 to $1.14 and the
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may be wary of exercising his or her right to organize when doing so presents the
risk that the employer will move operations abroad to take advantage of both cheap
foreign labor and the relative absence of labor law enforcement. 3 This state ' of
24
affairs stymies the rights of U.S. workers, causing a type of "race to the bottom
that the ILO was originally created to prevent.25
B.

The GlobalizationDebate

There are a number of conflicting views on the actual impact of globalization
on the U.S. economy. Recent reports from financial and economic research firms
have been cited by mass media news reports for the proposition that millions of
U.S. jobs, particularly white-collar positions, are being lost to overseas
competition.26 The fact that a large number of jobs are being moved to other
countries, primarily India, is not really in doubt.27 The actual impact that this new
trend will have on the U.S. job market, however, has been interpreted differently
One view looks to recent U.S. history, when the offshore outsourcing trend
was hitting the American manufacturing sector.28 Indeed, recent figures compiled
by the International Economics Institute show that U.S. manufacturing workers
who lost their jobs during that period, and who were subsequently able to find
other work, were forced to accept lower wages. 29 This history may support the
proposition that a similar fate awaits U.S. workers in white-collar positions
currently losing their jobs.30
The other view has looked behind the absolute figures reported by major
media sources to show the actual job losses the U.S. labor market is likely to suffer
because of outsourcig is closer to 214 000.31 The point has also been made that
receiving country on average 33 cents").
23. Champion, supranote 18, at192-93.
24. A race to the bottom could occur if labor markets with greater protections are willing to
sacrifice those protections to remain compeitive. Thus, instead of attempting to pull the market with
lower standards up, the protections of workers everywhere are sacrificed in an effort to gain or maintain
competlitve edge. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHAEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 263 (1995).
25. ILO History, supra note 2.
26. Steve Lohr, New Economy; Offshore Jobs in Technology: Opportunity or Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at CI (citing Forrester Research report published in November 2002 that
predicted 3.3 million services jobs in the U.S. would be outsourced to foreign countries by 2015); see
also David Zielenziger, U.S. Companies Moving More Jobs Overseas, YAHOO FINANCE, at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rb/031223/tech-techjobs_2.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004); see also Betsy Stark,
White-Collar Exodus: High-PayingJobs Are Moving Overseas, US. Workers Replaced by Foreigners,
ABC NEWS, at http:llabcnews.go.comlsections/wntBusmess/joblessO3O729_offshonng.html
(last
visilted Jan. 9, 2004).
27. New Wave, supra note 8, at 1; see also Zielenziger, supra note 26; Stark, supra note 26;
Farrell, supra note 22.
28. See New Wave, supra note 8, at 4.
29. See KLETZER, supranote 20, at 33.
30. New Wave, supranote 8, at 6.
31. Lohr, supra note 26 (explaining that the large number of 3.3 million services jobs being
moved offshore needs to be taken in the context of normal job creation and destruction in the U.S.
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the media is looking at figures that tell an maccurate story. It has been argued that
media reports have failed to consider figures spanning the period before and after
the U.S. economy went into its recent three-year recession.32 Therefore, the
figures reported by mass media may more accurately be
explained by other
33
economic activity aside from the influence of globalization.
A recent report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of
Globalizaton 34 (WCSDG) lends support for the argument that the benefits of
globalization are being disproportionately captured by MNCs to the detriment of
35
workers," that the
situation must change, 36 and one of the changes needs to come
in the form of more effective global institutions. 37 The report noted "[pleople are
most directly affected by globalization through their work and employment. 38
Indeed, the report cites the statements of some union leaders in industrialized
countries who lament that "[i]ncreased global competition [has] encouraged
employers to play 'fast and loose with labor practices,
including the replacement
work." 39
of decent employment with insecure
The debate over the true effects of globalization will likely continue to
capture the public's attention in the coming months and years. In the meantime,
invigorating international labor enforcement would protect U.S. workers most
vulnerable to overseas competition by ensuring fair competition between labor
markets. The U.S. should assume a leadership role in the ILO to advocate for such
change on behalf of its labor market and its workers.
II.

TWO OPTIONS FOR ENFORCING LABOR STANDARDS INTERNATIONALLY

As discussed above, U.S. employers often move labor abroad because of the
cost savings afforded in terms of lower labor standards.
Additionally,
globalization has been identified as an unstoppable force, due in part to recent
enhancements m technology and the decrease in the cost of moving goods. 40 The
benefits of the global economy have, however, been falling into the hands of a
small segment of the world's population.4' Moreover, the competitive edge that
economy).
32. Catherne L. Mann, Globalization of IT Services and White Collar Jobs: The Next Wave of
Productivity Growth, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS POLICY BRIEFS 6, at 4 (Dec. 2003), at
http://207.238.152.36/publications/pb/pbO3-1 I.pdf (last visiied Jan. 4, 2004).
33. See id
34. World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, Report of the World
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, at http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglish/wcsdg/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter WCSDG Report].
35. Id. at 46 ("The increased mobility of capital combined with high levels of unemployment has
weakened the bargaining position of workers vis-a-vis employers.").
36. Id. at 2 ("The current path of globalization must change. Too few share in its benefits. Too
many have no voice in its design and no influence on its course.").
37. Id. at 79.
38. Id. at 64.
39. Id.at 21.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Id. at 2.
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developing countries' labor markets currently hold over the U.S. because of lower
labor standards is not a salve for their problems. The result of competition where
the labor market with the lowest standards wins is that global labor standards are
undermined and all workers suffer,42 with the only true winner being the MNC.
A.

The PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality

This sub-part will focus on the extraterritorial application of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.43 While the discussion will be limited to Title VII, it is important
to note that this particular statute represents merely a fragment of the overarching
regulatory framework in the U.S. Moreover, the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws applicable to Title VII is also the scheme
applied to other labor laws.4 This sub-part intends to show that the presumption
agamst extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic labor laws enables U.S. MNCs
to take advantage of relatively lower labor protections in foreign countries.
Additionally, due to the presumption's strength, it is unlikely U.S. domestic labor
laws can be used to enforce labor standards internationally
I.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was part of a cadre of legislation
intended to remedy a number of evils in U.S. society, of which the U.S. public was
made painfully aware during the Civil Rights Movement.45 The scope of Title
VII's applicability to employment outside the U.S. was the primary issue in the
Supreme Court case of EEOC v. Aramco ("Aramco"). 46 The plaintiff in Aramco,
Ali Boureslan, was a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Lebanon who had originally
been hired by and worked for Aramco in the U.S. 47 Boureslan requested and was
later transferred to Aramco's offices in Saudi Arabia. 48 Aramco discharged him in
1984, and he alleged his termination was caused by religious, racial, and ethnic
discrimination by his Immediate supervisor.49 The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss with the District Court arguing that Title VII did not extend to U.S.
citizens employed by U.S. corporations abroad.50 The District Court granted the
42. See ILO CONST. pmbl.
43. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). For a more
thorough examination of the extraterritorial application of Title VII, see Kathryn M. Murphy, Title VII
and Its Ability to Bind American Companies Acting outside the UnitedStates, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 593 (1993).
44. The non-extraterritonal scope of other U.S. statutes protecting rights of workers mirrors the
analysis applied to Title VII. These statutes include: the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (2000); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); and the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
45. See generally CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF
THE 1960s (1995).
46. EEOC v. Aramico, 499 U.S. 244,246 (1991).
47. Id. at 247.
48. Id.
49. Boureslan v. Aramco, 653 F.Supp. 629, 631 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
50. Id.
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motion and dismissed the claim. 5' Boureslan appealed the decision to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the district court.5 2 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the absence of language addressing possible conflict-oflaw issues and the potential for broad applicability of Title VII to foreign
employers of U.S. citizens outside the U.S. counseled against interpreting Title VII
to apply extraterritonally 53
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorariand acknowledged that Congress
clearly has the authority under the Constitution to enforce its laws outside the
territorial boundaries of the U.S. 54 The Court went on to hold that when Congress
fails to clearly express its intent to extend laws abroad, courts should interpret such
silence to mean Congress meant the law to apply only domestically 55 This rule of6
statutory interpretation is referred to as the presumption against extraterritonality.1
Congress quickly responded and amended Title VII that same year.57 The
amendment's impact, however, was limited m that it extended the protections of
Title VII only to U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S. corporations.58 The
amendment also included a provision that settled the conflict-of-laws issue by
including an exception applicable in the event a U.S. corporation doing business m
a foreign country would be forced to violate the law of that country if it were to
follow Title VII. 59 Under such circumstances, the U.S. corporation is not required
to comply with Title VII.6°
Courts have addressed the presumption against extraterritorial application in
the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),6' the Age Discrimination m
Employment Act (ADEA),62 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 63 The
cases addressing these acts help show the presumption's breadth and how it is
applied in labor dispute controversies. 64 The scope of the presumption against
51. Id.at 631.
52. Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), affig en banc, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.

1990).
53. Aramco, 892 F.2d at 1273-74.
54. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
55. Id. at 255.
56. Id.at 248.
57. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b) ("It shall not be unlawful under [this section] for an employer (or
if compliance
to take any action otherwise prohibited
corporation controlled by an employer)
to violate the law of the foreign country in which such
with such section would cause such employer
workplace is located.").
60. Id.
61. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
62. Age Discrimination m Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
63. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
64. Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding seamen
employed on Kuwaiti vessels reflagged to gain U.S. protection during the Iran-Iraq war were not
covered by the FLSA); Reyes-Gaona v. North Am.Growers' Assoc., 250 F.3d 861, 866-67 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding the ADEA was inapplicable to foreign nationals applying for work in a foreign country
that would ultimately be performed inside the U.S., due to the presumption against extraterritoriality);
NLRB v. Dredge Operators, Inc., 19 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding the NLRB did have
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extraterritorial application was tested in Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corporation,
where
Title VII was interpreted to provide protection to aliens employed within the
65
U.S.
In Chaudhry, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded upon the facts
required before the protections of Title VII will be extended to a foreign national
applying for work m the U.S. Chaudhry, a Canadian citizen, worked for Mobil in
London, England and m Doha, Qatar for eighteen years.66 Mobil terminated him in
1997 and he brought suit claiming his discharge was a retaliatory act by Mobil
because of his complaints about discrimination.6 7 Mobil filed a motion to dismiss
Mr. Chaudhry's suit on grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.68 The district court granted the motion and Chaudhry appealed.69
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that "a foreign national who applies for a job in
the United States is entitled to Title VII protection 'only upon a successful
showing that the applicant was qualified for employment.' 70 The court explained
that in order to be qualified, the prospective employee must have been eligible for
work in the U.S. under the Immigration Reform and Control Act. 71 Chaudhry
conceded that he did not possess the documentation required by the Act, and
therefore the court affirmed the decision of the District Court. 72
The foregoing discussion shows that the presumption against
extratemtoriality has two effects upon the U.S. labor market. First, because U.S.
laws are not applicable to U.S. corporations employing foreign nationals abroad, it
affords these companies access to relatively cheap foreign labor. Second, because
MNC's can readily move their labor to foreign markets, U.S. workers may be more
reluctant to enforce protections the law provides them.73
2.

Contexts Outside Labor

In areas other than the labor context, U.S. courts have been more inclined to
enforce U.S. laws outside the territonal boundaries of the U.S. 74 In these

junsdiction over the defendant's operations because U.S. citizens were the majority of workers
employed on the Stuyvesant and because the ship flew a U.S. flag, effectively making it part of U.S.
territory).
65. Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp., 186 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 503-04.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 504.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1998)).
71. Chaudhry, 16 F.3d at 504-05.
72. Id.
73. See Champion, supra note 18, at 192.
74. See Stephen B. Moldof The Application of U.S. Labor Law to Activities and Employees
Outside the United States, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMp L., pt. I, at 2-3, available at
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2001/moldof.doc (last visited, Jan. 11, 2004); but see
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the
presumption against extrateritoriality and holding that the Copyright Act does not apply
extraterritorially).
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situations, the strong presumption against extraterritoriality, which operates to
forestall the application of many U.S. labor laws, gives way to other analytical
approaches.75 For example, U.S. law is applied to extraterritorial conduct m the
context of antitrust violations. 76 The Supreme Court has stated that the federal
anti-trust act covers foreign conduct intended to produce substantial effects in the
77
U.S.
The Supreme Court has also extended application of the Lanham Trademark
Act to conduct occurrng outside U.S. territorial boundaries.78
Yet another example is Environmental Defense Fund,Inc. v. Massey, where
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was faced with the issue of
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality prevented application of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 79 to a plan of the National
Science Foundation to incinerate food waste m Antarctica. go In Massey, the court
acknowledged the presumption against extraterritoriality, but held that it was not
applicable. 8 ' The court further stated that there are at least three categories of
cases where the presumption against extratemtonality does not apply- first, "where
there is an 'affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed;' second,
"where the failure to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result
m adverse effects within the United States;" and third, "when the conduct
regulated by the government occurs within the United States." 82 In its analysis, the
court determined the NEPA was intended to regulate federal agencies' decision
making, but not the substance of those decisions.83 Thus, the court concluded that
the case did not raise an issue of extraterritorial application because the conduct
being regulated had effectively occurred in the U.S.84 The court also distinguished
the case on its facts, stating the issue of extratemtonal application was less
troublesome because Antarctica was not a sovereign territory and the U.S. had
substantial authority over it. 85
The foregoing discussion highlights the fact that the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been applied differently to contexts other than labor. It also
appears the presumption has added vigor when the case is couched in the labor
context. While it is clear Congress has the power to extend application of U.S.
labor laws to conduct abroad," as the situation currently stands, it is unlikely
Congress will express its intent to extend U.S. laws abroad, because notions of
75. Moldof, supra note 74, at 2-3.
76. Edieth Yvette Wu, Evolutionary Trends in the United States Application of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 1, 17-20 (1997).
77. See Hartford Fire Ins., Co. v. California et al., 509 U.S. 764, 796, (1993); see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986).
78. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952) (holding the Lanham Trademark Act
applies extraterritonally when defendant is a U.S. national).
79. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f(2000).
80. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
81. Massey, 986 F.2d at 532.
82. Id. at 531.
83. Id. at 532.
84. Id. at 533.
85. Id.
86. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.

DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 32:4

sovereignty and jurisdiction s7 coupled with the potential for international discord
counsel against such change.88 It is therefore worthwhile to explore another option
for better enforcement of international labor standards.
B.

InternationalLabor Laws and the ILO

While there are a number of sources of international labor law, 9 the
conventions and recommendations of the ILO are currently viewed as the
foundation of international labor principles.9" Indeed, the ILO has been repeatedly
named as the international organization that should lead the charge for improving
international labor standards. 91 Yet, the ILO's valuable contribution to the
development of international standards and its ability to serve as the leader in the
future is undermined by the ILO's primary weakness: its lack of a viable
enforcement scheme. 92
I.

The Structure of the ILO

The ILO is made up of three main bodies. The body most representative of

87. Sovereignty, seen as an equivalent for independence and an important element of statehood,
cames with it "a jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over territory
[and] a duty of non-intervention
in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 78, 287 (4th ed. 1990). Jurisdiction operates as

limit on the scope of a national

court's power to hear a case or controversy brought before it and falls under the umbrella concept of
sovereignty. Id at 298.
88. See id. at 308 ("American [extraterritorial] policies have provoked
large number of foreign governments.").

strong reaction from

89. Labor issues have been addressed in a number of United Nations instruments concerning
human rights. See e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195

(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. Al6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1971); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doe. A134/46
(1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., annex, Supp.
No. 49, at 167, U.N, Doe. A/44/49 (1989); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., annex,
Supp. No. 49A, at 262, U.N. Doe. A/45/49 (1990). Additionally, the European Social Charter, Oct. 18,
1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965), and the American Convention on Human
Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970), also address labor issues. See Labour Law, supra note
1,at 114.
90. WCSDG Report, supranote 34, at 82.
91. Id., WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 19, 1996), 4, 36
I.L.M 218, 221 (1997) [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial Declaration];see also XI Summit of the

Heads of State and Government of the Group of Fifteen (May 30-31, 2001), 17, available at
http://www.un.orglesa/ffd/themes/gl5-2.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) ("We also strongly reiterate
that non-trade issues such as labour standards
should not be included in the WTO agenda.").
92. GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 44, 54 (2001); see also
Johnson, supranote 1, at 307.
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the member states is the International Labour Conference (ILC). 93

The ILC

normally meets once a year and is the body that adopts ILO conventions and
recommendations.94 The ILC consists of representatives who are selected by
member states. 95 The ILO also has a Governing Body. The Governing Body
consists of fifty-six members; twenty-eight represent member governments, while
the other twenty-eight are equally divided to represent the interests of workers and
employers equally 9
Finally, the ILO has a permanent secretariat called the
International Labour Office.97
There are two ostensible enforcement procedures available to assist members

and employers or workers put pressure on member countries that have ratified an
ILO convention, but that have had a poor record in implementing the convention.
The first procedure is a complaint. 98 Complaints may, however, only be made by a
member state against another member state if both countries have ratified the
convention at issue. 99 The second procedure is called a representation.' 00
Representations are made either by employers' or by workers' organizations on the

grounds that the member state has failed to implement a ratified convention. 1'
The enforcement powers of the ILO have been viewed as insufficient,
however, to meet the task of protecting the rights of workers.'0 2 Support for this
proposition is found m ILO Committee on Freedom of Association cases. 10 3
Indeed, in some cases, a few of which will be discussed below, the Committee fails
to make any concrete determination due to a lack of sufficient mformation.'°4

93. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at I11.

94. ILO conventions are similar to codified law in the U.S. Conventions are binding upon
member states that have ratified the convention. Id. Recommendations are analogous to comments
following a code section. The purpose of recommendations is to clarify and further develop the policy
expressed in the convention. Id. Recommendations are non-binding by design. Id.
95. Id., there are a total of four delegates from each member state: two represent the member
state's government, one advocates for the interests of workers and another one advocates for the
interests of employers. WALTER GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: AN
AMERICAN ViEw 11 (1981).
96. Labour Law, supra note 1, at 111.
97. Id.

98. ILO CONST. art. 26.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. art. 24.
LabourLaw, supra note 1, at 125.
TSOGAS, supranote 92, at 54.

103. See Complaint Against the Government of India Presented by the Centre of Indian Trade
Unions, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, (ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 2003), availableat
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter India 1], see also Complaints against
the Government of the Uited States Presented by the Amencan Federation of Labor and the Congress
of Industrial Organizations and the Confederation of Mexican States, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332,
(ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter AFL-CIO].
104. India 1,Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, 468; AFL-CIO Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332, 616.
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Survey of Relevant Conventions

To date, the ILC has adopted 185 conventions105 and 194 recommendations'0 6
addressing a host of labor related issues. One of the main problems facing the ILO
in formulating its standards is the need to account for the vast differences between
economic and social conditions in member countries. 10 7 At the same time, the ILO
seeks to pass conventions advancing upon existing common practices in an effort
to improve the overall conditions of the average worker.'is In order to achieve
these goals, the ILO often uses conventions to create a floor for labor protections
and simultaneously promotes higher standards through its recommendations. 109 A
discussion of select ILO conventions, and their application in states like India, will
provide an example of how the ILO's weak enforcement powers are a stumbling
block for effective protection of all workers.' "
The ILC adopted the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation in 1958.'1 The term discrimination includes: "any
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion,
political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of
nullifying or impaing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or
occupation."' 2 Other classes of workers, like the aged and those with disabilities,
are not explicitly protected by the convention, but ratifying member states have the
discretion to extend protection to those classes of workers as well.ii 3 The
convention also provides that exclusion for a specific position based upon the
"inherent requirements" of the job will not be considered discrimination. 1 14 The
convention further provides that any member state ratifying the text is obligated to
implement the text as part of its national policy." 5 The selection of appropriate
convention enforcement and implementation methods are left to the ratifying

105. See
International
Labour
Organization
Internet
Library,
at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/cvlist.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) (note that not all ILO
conventions are currently in force).
106. See International Labour Organization Internet Library, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/
reclist.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
107. See NiCOLAS VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 49-52 (1979).

108. Id. at 50 ("mhe purpose of standards is not simply to harmonize legislation, but primarily to
promote generalized progress.").
109. Id. at 44-45.
110. Note that this paper will focus on conventions where U.S. law covers the same subject matter
in an effort to show that some ILO conventions largely mirror protections already afforded workers in
the U.S.
11. See Convention No. 11l Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation, at http://www.ilo.orglilolex (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Discrimination
Convention].
112. Id. art. l(l)(a).
113. Id. art. l(l)(b) ("[Sluch other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of
nullifying or impairng equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation as may be
determined by the Member concerned after consultation with representative employers' and workers'
organisations, where such exist, and with other appropriate bodies.").
114. Id. art. 1(2).
115. Id. art. 2.
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member state's discretion. "1
1 7
The U.S. has not ratified the ILO Convention Concerning Discrmination.
However, Title VII gives U.S. workers protections analogous to those recited in
the ILO convention. Title VII provides for enforcement through individual
lawsuits filed by persons who have been the victims of discriminatory treatment or
impact. ' 8 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can also initiate9
actions against employers who have allegedly committed acts of discnmination.1
Title VII protects the same classes of people from discrummatory treatment as the
ILO convention. 120 Title VII also includes a defense for employers, similar to the
ILO convention exclusion for jobs with "inherent requirements, called the "bona
fide occupational qualification."'1'
Unlike the U.S., India has ratified the Convention Concerning
Discrimination. 2 2
The Indian government ratified the ILO Convention
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation in 1960.23
As part of the ILO's enforcement scheme, it periodically dispatches observers to
countries that have ratified its conventions, and the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations ("CEACR") publishes a report
of these observations. 14 In 2003, the CEACR released its report on observations
in India concerning the implementation of the Convention Concerning
Discrimmation.125 The report noted that the Indian government had made some
progress toward improving discrimination against women, but added that there
remained substantial room for improvement.' 26 Specifically, the report found that
discrimination continued in the form of restricted access to education for Indian

116. Id.
117. To date, the U.S. has ratified fourteen ILO conventions, only twelve of which remain in force.
These twelve are: Officers' Competency Certificates Convention No. 53, Shipowners' Liability
Convention No.55, Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised) No. 58, Certification of Able Seamen
Convention No. 74, Final Articles Revision Convention No. 80, Abolition of Force Labour Convention
No. 105, Tnpartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention No. 147, Labour
Administration Convention No. 150, Labour Statistics Convention No.160, Safety and Health in Mines
Convention No. 176, and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182. See List of Ratifications
of International Labour Conventions: United States, at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex (last visited Mar. 16,
2004) [hereinafter U.S. Ratifications].
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-2(a)(2).
119. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(6), 2000e-5(a).
120. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(a)(2).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l).
122. The degree of enforcement of the ILO convention in India will be discussed because India is
the destination of a substantial number of outsourced U.S.jobs. See Stark, supra note 27.
123. See List of Ratifications of International
Labour Conventions:
India, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) [hereinafter India Ratifications].
124. See VALTICOS, supra note 107, at 242.
125. See CEACR, Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 111, Discrimination
(Employment
and
Occupation),
1958
India
(ratification:
1960)
(2003),
at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newcountryframeE.htrn (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter
Discrimination Observations.
126. ld. 2.
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females. 127 Furthermore, the fact that women constitute only a small minority of
the formal workforce was indicative that discrimination continued to exist in the
labor market.' 28 This conclusion is also supported by statistical figures compiled
by the statistics division of the United Nations, which show Indian women only
represented about seventeen percent of the non-agricultural workforce m 2001.129
The ILC adopted Convention Number 26, Concerning Minimum Wage-fixing
Machinery, in 1928.130 The convention provides that a ratifying country must
apply or maintain a regulatory scheme for jobs where the rate of compensation is
exceptionally low. 13 1 The convention additionally requires a ratifying country to
institute a complaint process by which workers who have been under compensated
may seek the appropriate compensation required under national law. 132
The U.S. has not ratified this Convention. 33 The Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") is the U.S. statute most analogous to this Convention, and it provides for
a minimum wage as well as setting the maximum hours for work in a given
week. 134 If an employee exceeds the maximum hours and is not otherwise exempt,
then the employee is entitled to receive overtime pay at the rate of one and onehalf his or her base wage rate. 135 The enforcement procedures m the U.S. are
highly developed and provide for a private36cause of action for workers m addition
to enforcement by the Secretary of Labor.
The Indian government ratified ILO Convention Number 26 m 1955.137
Similar to the status of implementation found with regard to the Convention
Concerning Discrimination, the CEACR found in 2003 that the Indian
government's implementation of this Convention was lacking. 38 In its report on
observations in India, the CEACR found there was no established national
minimum wage, 139 but the government had passed a law creating a national "floorlevel" wage.' 4° The report also found varying minimum wage rates in different
states in India. 14 The national government explained that decentralized legislation

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. United Nations Statistics Division Millennium Indicators, at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ (last
visited Jan. 7, 2004).
130. See Convention No. 26 Concerning the Creation of Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, June
16, 1928,
at http://www.ilo.orglilolex/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Wage-Fixing
Convention].
131. Id. art. 1.
132. Id. art. 4.
133. See U.S. Ratifications, supra note 117.
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207
135. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
137. See India Ratifications, supra note 123.
138. CEACR, Individual Observation Concerning Convention No. 26, Minunum Wage-Fixing
Machinery,
1928 India (ratification:
1955) (2003), at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english
/newcountryframeE.htm (last visited, Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Wage-Fixing Observations].
139. Id. 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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was necessary due to the different living cost rates in each state.

42

Another problem the report uncovered was the influence corporations were
exerting on the Indian state governments' legislative process. 143 This pressure
created industry specific wage rates below the states' own established mmunum
wage. 44 The state governments' explanation for this discrepancy was that
employers have threatened to relocate their businesses to other neighboring states
where the minimum wage is lower. 45 Finally, the report explained that recent
changes in some Indian states' regulations deny labor inspectors charged with the
task of momtorng mmunum wage legislation application the power to carry out
their mspections.' 46 This state of affairs highlights the lack of bite in current ILO
enforcement processes. A country ratifying a convention has an obligation to
implement the ratified convention, but there is no effective means of ensuring it
actually accomplishes the goal.
The foregoing discussion of a few ILO conventions supports two points.
First, the ILO's observation and reporting mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure
countries that have ratified conventions live up to their obligations. Second, the
discussion also shows U.S. laws analogous to the surveyed conventions currently
extend essentially the same protections to U.S. workers. 47
3.

ILO Enforcement Lacks Bite

All member countries are required to protect certain rights represented by ILO
conventions, regardless of ratification. 1 Freedom of association is one of the key
rights protected by the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. 49 The right of association is unique in the context of the ILO.
Since the ILO's purpose was reaffirmed at the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944,
the right of workers to associate for the purpose of organizing has been considered
fundamental.' 5" Furthermore, if member states have violated the right of
association, they are subject to the complaint procedures before the Committee on
Freedom of Association. 15'
Neither the U.S. nor India has ratified any of the ILO conventions concerning

142. Id. 3.
143. Id. 8.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See infra Part III for a discussion on the significance of the second point
148. See ILO, Declaration of Fundamental Rights at Work,
2, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited, March 6, 2004) [hereinafter Declaration of Fundamental Rights].
149. Id., see also TsoGAs, supranote 92, at 51-52.
150. See ILO CONST. Declaration of Philadelphia.
151. See VALTICOS, supra note 98, at 249 (explaining that the Committee on Freedom of
Association is a nine person committee appointed by the Governing Body from among its own
membership. Three of the members represent the interests of governments, three represent employers,
and three represent workers.).
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the rights of workers to associate.1 2 In the U.S., the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) is the statute most analogous to these ILO conventions and confers upon
covered U.S. workers the right to associate, organize, and bargain collectively 153
Both the U.S. and India have been subject to the Committee on Freedom of
Association's complaint procedures.'5 4 These cases help emphasize the point that
the enforcement procedures of the ILO lack bite. In both cases, the Committee
found there was insufficient
information and merely tasked both countries with
55
further fact finding.
The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) together with the Confederation of Mexican Workers
(CTM) brought the case against the U.S. 156 The complaints alleged the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor
Relations Board157 divested millions of immigrant workers of their protection
under the law ensuring their freedom of association." 8 In the Hoffman decision,
the Court held that the NLRA does not extend to an undocumented immigrant who
59
was dismissed from his position for exercising rights protected under the Act.
The Committee identified the case's issue as a question of whether the Hoffman
Court's decision limited the remedies available to undocumented workers to such
an extent that the protection of such workers' freedom of association no longer had
any real meaning. 16° The U.S. government's reply to the complaint was quick to
point out that the Hoffman decision was very narrow, applying only to the remedy
of back-pay 161 The Committee noted, however, that with back-pay unavailable,
the only remedies still available were a cease and desist order and possible
contempt sanctions if the employer failed to comply.' 62 The Committee
determined that the U.S. 1position
was insufficient to ensure the fundamental right
63
of freedom of association.
It was in the Committee's recommendations, however, where its lack of true
enforcement power is revealed. The most the Committee could muster was to
recommend that the U.S. government "explore all possible solutions, including
amending the legislation to bring it into conformity with freedom of association
152. See U.S. Ratifications, supranote 117; see also India Ratifications, supra note 123.
153. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
154. See CITU I, Case No. 2228, Rep.No. 331; AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332.
155. AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332., 613; See Complaint Against the Government of
India Presented by the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 332, IN 751(a), (c)
(ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter CJTU l1] Note that while the cases cited here will be discussed in this
paper, there are many more Freedom of Association Cases. See Freedom of Association Cases,
availableat http://www.ilo.orgilolex/ (last visited Mar. 14,2004).
156. AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332, 551.
157 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
158. AFL-CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332., 555.
159. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149.
160. AFL-CIO Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332, 603.
161. Id. 580.

162. Id. 609.
163. Id. 610.
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principles
with the aim of ensuring effective protection for all workers against
acts of anti-union discrimination in the wake of the Hoffman decision."'6 The
Committee found the U.S. legal position left millions of workers effectively
unprotected, yet it could merely make a recommendation that the U.S. "explore all
possible solutions.
The second case is one involving the Indian government and instances of antiunion activity in that country. 65 In this case, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions
66
(CITU) filed a complaint with the ILO alleging anti-union discrimmation.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Development Commissioner of one of
India's Export Processing Zones (EPZ) had personally warned workers they could
lose their jobs if they joined a trade union.' 67 Additionally, the complaint claimed
that the workers of one EPZ had gone on strike and that both the employer and the
state police took actions to "brutally suppress" and "terrorize" the workers. 68
Finally, the complaint alleged the employer had taken retaliatory action by
terminating a number of the workers viewed as instigators of the strike. 169 The
Government's response denied the allegations as untrue and explained some
workers were later terminated because of "indiscipline, irregularity and failure to
learn."' 170 The Committee initially found it had insufficient information and
instructed the government to provide more detailed information.' 7' The Indian
government followed up with a communication dated August 5, 2003, and attached
a report from the Development Commissioner of the EPZ at issue in the case. 72
After reviewing the report, the Committee was once again left with
insufficient and non-responsive information from the Indian government. 73 The
Committee, however, merely requested that the Indian government take efforts to
conduct a thorough investigation of the incident.174 Ultimately a statement CITU
made in its complaint-that its only true recourse for protection was the Chief
Justice of the Indian Supreme Court- appears to have been an 1 accurate
assessment of the Committee's mability to provide meaningful assistance. 75
The foregoing cases show the complaining parties received no dispute
resolution and no Commitee statement on what remedial measures either country
would be required to perform. The absence of meaningful enforcement arguably
encourages member countries to disregard even ratified ILO conventions and
violate the fundamental right of association. 176 In order for the ILO to effectively
164. Id. 613.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See C1TUI, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331.
Id. $ 451.
Id.
Id. 454.
Id. 452.
Id. 9460.
Id.9467.
C1TUI, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 332., 733.
Id. 740, 742, 745.
Id. 751(a).
See CITUI, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, 455.
Tsogas, supra note 92, at 54 (stating that governments "suffer no penalties when
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improve working conditions and ensure fundamental rights of workers are
protected, it must be vested with powers that will give its enforcement bite.
The WTO as a Model for Enforcement Powers

4.

This section will provide a brief overview of the enforcement scheme
employed m the WTO. Following the overview, the paper will argue that the
WTO's enforcement powers should be used as a model for ILO enforcement, thus
ensuring workers' rights are protected. The ancillary benefit of such enforcement
powers is that they will promote a greater degree of fair competition between the
U.S. and foreign labor markets because egregious practices amounting to unfair
competition could be effectively combated.
a.

The WTO Enforcement Processes

Early dispute resolution procedures employed under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),117 which preceded the WTO, relied primarily upon
negotiations between member states to resolve disputes.1 7 8 This process eventually
gave way to the more formal legalistic procedures of adjudication. 179 The change
was motivated by two factors. First, parties to a dispute often met with significant
delays and problems in enforcing their negotiated settlement; second, there was a
need for increased dispute resolution process legitimacy iSO
During the Uruguay Round, the enforcement procedures of international trade
took steps' 8 ' toward their current form; two years later, 182 those changes were the
foundation for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes.is Under the WTO's dispute resolution rules, a member
state may bring a complaint before the WTO's dispute resolution body- following a
hearing, the losing party may appeal the decision. ' 4 Decision enforcement is
or compensation for
usually accomplished by withdrawal of trade concessions
85
harm resulting from violations of trade sanctions.
These processes allow WTO member states to resolve disputes primarily

[conventions]

are breached").

177 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT]; see also Lawrence D. Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism:
Building a JustMechanismfor WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 AM. Bus. L. J. 511, 512 (2003).
178. See Roberts, supra note 177, at 512.
179. Id. at 513-18.
180. See id. at 516-17
181. Conciliation Improvements to the GATT, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61-67
(1990) [hereinafter Improvements].
182. Roberts, supra note 177, at 517-23.
183. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Umaguay
Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, MTN/FA II-A2
(Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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because the WTO includes meaningful and effective enforcement provisions. 8 6 If
a member country is subject to repercussions for violating its obligations under the
WTO, it is the threat of such a result that promotes compliance.
b.

The WTO as an Example for the ILO

The ILO needs an enforcement scheme that is robust and effective like that of
the WTO if it is to be successful in both setting international labor standards and
ensuring they are followed. However, an enforcement process similar to that
available to WTO member states will be difficult to achieve. There are two
primary reasons for this difficulty First, developing countries view enhanced
labor regulation as a form of protectionism that will wrest one of their primary
competitive advantages, luring MNC investment through cheap labor, from
them. 187Second, the Director General of the ILO has stated that use of coercive
economic enforcement mechanisms is beyond the jurisdiction and institutional
expertise of the organization. 18
ILO member states that are developing countries will likely resist the
implementation of more effective enforcement mechanisms because it will threaten
one of the few competitive advantages they currently possess to attract MNC
mvestment. 8 9 Their reasoning, however, is faulty because it is susceptible to the
counter-argument that foreign investment is not currently beneficial to developing
countries' workers because most of the value created by their labor is not captured
by the local economy.' 90 Rather, the large profits MNCs obtain by exploiting
foreign workers are exported along with the goods or services to the U.S.
market. 191 Thus, as the situation stands today, foreign workers lose because they
fail to retain any significant portion of the wealth they help create, and U.S.
workers lose because they are unable to retain employment. The only interest
winning in the current vacuum in enforceable labor legislation is that of MNCs.
With the increased enforcement power of the ILO would come an ancillary
benefit to the U.S. labor market: fair competition abroad. Of course, identifying
this situation as beneficial is problematic; it lends credence to the argument that the
U.S. would only pursue such a course because of protectiomst motivations.i92
There is, however, a distinction between protectionism and unfair international
labor competition. As stated m the introduction to this paper, one motivating
reason the ILO was created was to ensure that member countries could take actions
186. See Steve Charnovitz, Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO: Triangulating the World
magnet for
Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT'L .L. 28, 29 (2002) ("[The WTO has become
expansionist ideas because it is perceived as powerful and effective.").
187. See TSOGAS, supra note 92, at 28, 44-45; see also Singapore MinisterialDeclaration,supra
note 91, 4,36 I.L.M. at 221.
188. TSOGAS, supranote 92, at 47.
189. Cf id. at 45 (noting that developing countries have been against linking labor standards to trade
because they view it as motivated by protectionism).
190. See Lohr,supra note 26.
191. See td.
192. See TSOGAS,supra note 92, at 45.
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to protect workers without fear that other countries would be free to undercut the
market. 93 Additionally, requiring a country to adhere to its ratified obligations
under an ILO convention is not protectionist, but rather a demand that such
countries honor their commitments. If a country finds a convention it ratified
unfair or protectionist, it is free to denounce the convention.' 94 Therefore, U.S.
policy would be one of fair competition rather than protectionism.
The reluctance of the ILO to take on economic enforcement powers is at odds
with its Constitution, which states that member states ratifying ILO conventions
have a binding obligation to undertake actions toward implementation. 9' As
discussed above, the absence of enforcement has allowed member states to ratify
conventions without fear of repnsal if they subsequently fail to implement. 196 This
state of affairs undermines the ILO's goals of promotmg economic and social
justice. 197 Indeed, lack of meanmgful enforcement has, in some cases, rendered
both conventions and the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work essentially empty promises.19 The ILO should not balk at obtaining the tool
of enforcement, which will enable it to effectively carry out its goals.
III. U.S.

LEADERSHIP IN THE ILO AND ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT

This section will discuss two connected actions the U.S. should take m order
to enhance the ILO's viability as an international organization which
sunultaneously works to protect the interests of the U.S. labor market and the
rights of workers abroad. First, the U.S. should take a leadership role m the ILO
by ratifying as many conventions as possible in the near term. Second, the U.S.
should work toward enhancing the ILO's enforcement powers. As part of this
second step, the U.S. should make efforts to vest the ILO with trade sanction
enforcement powers similar to the WTO's enforcement powers.
A.

U.S. Ratification ofILO Conventions

The U.S. has failed to ratify a significant number of ILO conventions.
Indeed, the U.S. rate of ratification is on par with countries like Afghanistan'" and
Indonesia.2 °0 One reason for the failure of the U.S. to ratify a number of ILO
193. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110; ILO History, supra note 2.
194. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 123; see also VIRGINIA A. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CoNvErrioNs AND NATIONAL LAW 10 (1982).
195. ILO CONST. art. 20; see also LEARY, supra note 194, at 10; see also TSOGAS, supra note 92, at
51.
196. See, e.g., Discrimination Convention, supra note 111; Discrimination Observations, supra
note 125; Wage-Fixing Convention, supra note, 130; Wage-Fixing Observations, supra note 138; AFL
CIO, Case No. 2227, Rep. No. 332; CITU 1, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331.
197. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 110.
198. See CITU I, Case No. 2228, Rep. No. 331, 455 (noting the CITU stated in its complaint that
its only true recourse for protection was the Supreme Court of India).
199. See List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: Afghanistan, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2004) (listing fifteen ratifications).
200. See List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions: Indonesia, at
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conventions is the concern that ratified ILO conventions could conflict with
national and state laws. 20' Moreover, under the current machinery in place, no ILO
convention is forwarded for ratification
if such ratification would require a change
202
in U.S. federal and state laws.
Under the U.S. Constitution, adopted treaties become the "supreme Law of
the Land., 20 3 The U.S. has recently begun to insert reservations into treaties m
order to: prevent conflicts between ratified treaties and the Constitution; clarify
that U.S. ratification does not carry with it an obligation to change domestic laws;
and render treaties non self-executing, meaning U.S. courts do not need to enforce
the treaty unless Congress passes laws making the treaty enforceable. 20 4 These
practices undermine the credibility of U.S. leadership m foreign affairs because the
U.S., through such qualified ratification, is arguably acting to remove the treaty
obligations while simultaneously sitting in judgment over other countries. 201
Notably, this practice is not possible with ILO conventions, because ILO
convention ratification must be unqualified. 206 The failure of the U.S. to ratify ILO
conventions might be explained by the recent U.S. practice of qualified treaty
ratification, which is not available for ILO conventions.
Yet, where the international standard expressed by ILO conventions would
extend analogous protections as those already afforded under current U.S. laws,
then the U.S. should not be hesitant to ratify. 20 7

Indeed, as discussed above,

current U.S. law extends equal or greater protections to U.S. workers than those m
a number of ILO conventions. 20 8 Thus, the U.S. should not find ratification of
such conventions problematic.
For example, the Convention Concerning
Discrimination in Employment and Occupation is narrower than current U.S. laws
concerning discrimination. 2 9 Indeed, the ILO convention calls for the protection
of fewer classes of persons than are protected by the combination of Title VII, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
http://www.ilo.org/iolex/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) (listing sixteen ratifications).

201. Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy, Second Report to the Secretary of State and the
President of the United States, Dec. 31, 2001, at http:/Iwww.state.gov/g/drl/rls/lO043pf.htm (last visited
Jan. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Second Report].
202. See Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy, Minutes, Dec. 19, 2001 at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/1i253pf.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).

203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl.
2, see also TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 1 (2001).

204. Louis Henkm, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
205. Id. at 344.
206. Labour Law, supra note 1, at 123.
207. See Justine Nolan & Michael Posner, International Standards to Promote Labor Rights: The
Role of the United States Government, 2000 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 529, 535 (2000) (arguing the U.S.
should take action to ratify ILO Conventions); see also Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and
International Human Rights, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 145, 154 (Louis
Henkm et a]. eds., 1990) (arguing the exchange of ideas concerning human rights needs to be a "twoway proposition if the United States, as well as other countries, is to prosper
over the long haul")
208. See supra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
209. Compare Discrimination Convention, supra note 111, art. I(a)-(b), to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
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210

The Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy recognizes the need for the
U.S. to take a leadership position in international labor matters. 211 The Committee
acknowledged that some developing countries have referred to the lack of U.S.
ratification as a reason why they have either failed to ratify conventions or have
not adequately implemented the protections called for by the convention.212 The
view of the Advisory panel is that the U.S. could make substantial progress m its
ability to advocate for enhanced labor standards m all countries if it assumed a
leadership role in the ILO.2 i3 A leadership role, however, requires ratification.
The U.S. is hardly in a position to proselytize the benefits of enhanced labor
protection to the rest of the world if it has failed to bind itself by the same set of
rules.
If the U.S. seeks to level the playing field between the domestic labor market
and those abroad, then an effective long-term solution is ratification of as many
ILO conventions as possible. Once the U.S. has taken the step of ratification, it
will be in a better position than it is today to advocate for increased worker
protections. 214 This approach represents sound foreign policy as well, because
U.S. interests could be protected through its participation in an internationally
established organization that counts among its membership nearly every country
on the globe.2i 5
B.

Giving ILO Enforcement Bite

By binding itself to ensure its workers have the same minimum labor
standards as other ILO member countries, the U.S. will also be in a better position
to advocate for enhanced ILO enforcement powers. In this leadership role, the U.S.
could advocate to vest the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association with
powers similar to the WTO's enforcement powers.
It is important to note that many scholars have discussed the concept of
creating links between the WTO and the ILO in one form or another.21 6 During the
1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference, part of the agenda was determining

210. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Equal Opportunity for Individuals
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (this act is often publicly referred to as the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
211. See Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy Minutes, Dec. 19, 2001, at
http:llwww.state.govlgldrllrls/1 1253pf.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
212. See Advisory Committee on Labor Diplomacy Minutes, Oct. 4, 2001, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drlI/10044.pf.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
213. See id.
214. See Labour Law, supra note 1, at 125 (noting that ILO complaint procedures require
ratification by both the complaining and defending country).
215. See List of Member Countries, at http://www.ilo.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
216. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organizationand the Protectionof Workers Rights, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 169 (1999); Nolan & Posner, supra note 211, at 535; Daniel A.
Zaheer, Note, Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Developing Countries should Accept Labor
Standardsin the WTO, 9 STAN. J. L. Bus & FiN. 69 (2003).
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whether a formal link should be created between the WTO and the ILO. 217 In the
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO member countries decided against
creating a link between trade and labor standards, opting to leave labor issues to
the ILO. 2ia This decision, however, left labor issues m the hands of an international
organization without effective enforcement powers.219 Additionally the notion
that the WTO should not take on labor issues was reaffirmed m a Joint
Communique from the Eleventh Conference of the Heads of State and the Group
of Fifteen,220 as well as m the Doha Ministerial Declaration.22'
Most of the thikmg in this area argues that the link between trade and labor
should vest the WTO with the authority to resolve labor disputes. 222 Alternatively
it is also argued that the ILO and WTO should be joint actors m enforcing
international labor standards. 223 In light of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration,
the Joint Communiqud, the Doha Ministerial Declaration, and the recent report
from the WCSDG, the ILO should be vested with enforcement efforts independent
of the WTO. 224 The foundation for sanctions-based enforcement arguably already
exists in Article Thirty-Three of the ILO Consitution.225 In addition to the
decision m the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the Joint Commumqud, and the
Doha Ministerial Declaration, which show that WTO members are recalcitrant to
link the ILO to the WTO, there is arguably an additional reason why enforcement
should be vested m the ILO alone.
The WTO's primary objective is arguably focused on the liberalization of
trade, 26 and there may be times when protecting labor by limiting trade may create
an institutional conflict of interest. The idea that the WTO may at times have
217. See Howse, supra note 223, at 133-35.
218. SingaporeMinisterialDeclaration,supra note 91, 4, 36 I.L.M. 221.
219. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP L. 257, 275 (2000).
220. XI Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Fifteen, Joint Communique
(May 30-31), 17, at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/themes/gl5-2.htm (last visited, Mar. 6,2004).
221. WTO, Doha MinisterialDeclaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I (Nov. 14, 2001), 8, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tewto_e/ministe/mm01e/mindecle.htm (last visited Mar. 16,2004).
222. Howse, supra note 223, at 170; Nolan & Posner, supra note 223, at 535; Zaheer, supra note
223, at 100.
223. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for
International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F Diamond eds., 1996).
224. But see id. at 164 (noting that the ILO has balked at the idea of linking enforcement of labor
standards to trade because it was seen as "beyond the expertise and mandate of the organization"); see
also Tsogas, supranote 92, at 47.
225. ILO CONsT. art. 33 (stating that "the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference
if member state fails to
such actions as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance
comply with recommendations of Commission of Inquiry or a decision from the International Court of
Justice); see also Zaheer, supra note 18, at 84.
226. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. It 1 (stating that the scope
of the WTO shall "provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations
"); see also id, art. III 2 (stating that the
among its Members m matters related to the agreements
functions of the WTO shall "provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their
"); see also WCSDG Report,
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements
supra note 34, at 113.
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institutional conflicts of interest is supported by findings in the WCSDG report,
which noted that some WTO policies are m some ways inimical to developing
countries' interests because they reflect an unfair balance in favor of economically
powerful nations. 227 The report further stated some WTO policies pose a limit on
developing countries and their ability to take advantage of opportunities for
economic growth. 228 These examples provide support for the notion that if the
WTO were given the mandate to enforce labor rights, the WTO's institutional
interest in liberalizing trade might conflict with enforcing labor standards calling
for more restrictions, to the detriment of some ILO members. The WTO's success
in increasing respect for the rule of law and belief in the efficacy and legitimacy of
its enforcement powers counsels in favor of using the WTO as the model for
invigorating ILO enforcement. 2 29 However, it may be time for the ILO to consider
using that model independent of the WTO.
The ILO's conventions, recommendations, and Declaration of Fundamental
Principals and Rights at Work all represent policies protecting the interests of
workers irrespective of their location on the globe. 23 0 Providing the ILO with an
effective means of ensuring all ILO member states live up to their commitments is
sound global policy. Indeed, the WCSDG in its recent report recognized the
fundamental importance of protecting the rights of workers both in industrialized
and developing countries and added that the most effective way to accomplish the
goal was to follow the model established by the ILO.23 ' Yet, the ILO's standards
only have value for everyday workers if there is an effective enforcement regime
that delivers on the promises embodied in ratified conventions and the Declaration
on Fundamental Principals and Rights at Work.
IV

CONCLUSION

MNCs today have ready access to foreign labor markets and take advantage
of the current vacuum in enforceable labor regulation to obtain cheap labor and
easy access to the wealthiest market in the world. The problems U.S. workers face
are compounded by the ever-present threat that if they choose to exercise the
protections available under U.S. laws, their employer could leave them
unemployed. Today the ILO's conventions represent the international standard of
fundamental labor laws. The only short fall of the ILO is its lack of bite in terms
of enforcement. While member states have ratified various conventions, they are
not subject to enforceable repercussions if they fail to take steps necessary to
implement the protections. The U.S. is in a position to change the current
situation, but it must be willing to overcome some hurdles. One available course is
for the U.S. to ratify as many ILO conventions as possible and to work toward
empowering the ILO in a manner similar to the WTO. This path would help to
227. WCSDG Report, supranote 34, at 81.
228. Id.
229. See Chamovitz, supra note 186, at 29 ("[Tlhe WTO has become a magnet for expansionist
ideas because it is perceived as powerful and effective.").
230. ILO CONST. pmbl.
231. See WCSDG Report, supranote 34, at 82.
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ensure that the U.S. labor market and its workers are not harmed by unfair
competition in the new global economy

